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narrative empathy seems quite fluid, its connective strength ebbing and flowing throughout a
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1. Introduction
In her book Empathy and the Novel, Suzanne Keen describes empathy as “a vicarious,
spontaneous sharing of affect, [which] can be provoked … even by reading” (Keen, 4). As a
narratologist, Keen is primarily interested in the narrative form of empathy, and narrows her
definition by including the readers' “spontaneous, responsive sharing of an appropriate feeling”
(my emphasis, ibid). 
As a student of narratology, I investigated the first part of Keen's definition in my
bachelor essay, considering narrative empathy in Shakespeare's Macbeth. The study determined,
among other things, how the plot and the narrative structure collude to create reader empathies
strong enough to make the justifiable killing of the murderous Macbeth “tragic.” While these
findings were fruitful, the study was “static” in its approach; it looked at one character and a
singular reader trajectory; empathy is developed,  drawing the readers into the story and deepens
to a point where the ending is seen as tragic. 
This static approach limits our understanding of more complex and ambiguously
emotional storylines; those leading to a “dynamic” form of narrative empathy; storylines that
create an ebb and flow to our empathetic connection with the characters. One thing that seems
missing from the static study is Keen's notion of appropriate feeling; the idea that empathy is a
link to a specific emotion. Keen does not dwell on this emotional connection, or whether it is
necessary for empathy. Therefore, while Keen's insight and discussion is paramount, empathies'
relationship to emotion and dynamic action is not fully satisfied. In order to thoroughly
understand dynamic narrative empathy, finding the link between empathy and emotion is critical.
This narratological study will draw on material from a variety of other fields; such as cognitive
psychology, philosophy, reader response theory, and cognitive narratology. This essays aim is to
weave key points made in these differing areas together, to fully define the phenomenon of
dynamic narrative empathy, which will then be applied to Ursula K. Le Guin's The Left Hand of
Darkness, highlighting how the dynamic relationship between the two main characters affects,
among other things, how readers come to accept characters that are vastly different than
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themselves, how dynamic empathies create ambiguities, and how our pre-conceived notions
change during a reading, potentially modifying our actual world thinking.  
A notable narratological study relevant to understanding dynamic empathy is Marie-
Laurie Ryan's book Narrative as Virtual Reality 2, because she discusses the concept of
immersion and its relationship to emotion. Yet, while she speaks at length of reader immersion,
transportation, and emotion, all important concepts leading towards an understanding of dynamic
empathy, she too does not connect emotion and empathy in a way that sufficiently describes this
dynamic relationship as being considered here. In fact, few researchers seem to consider this
dynamic reader interaction at all. However, it is very specific, and emotion has been marginalized
as a serious subject until rather recently. Contemplating psychology, David S. Miall, considers
that while cognitive science has [now] researched this area, “psychological studies of reader
responses to narrative have … paid little attention to the role of emotions” (Miall, 323). This may
be due to what Jeffrey Pence thinks, that “emotional responses are often seen as less rational and
mature than other responses” (Pence, 273). This indicates a certain stigma surrounding emotion
may have caused a traditional gap in the research. While this is changing, the dynamic between
empathy and emotion still remains rather unexplored, and this paper intends to help fill this gap. 
In initially defining dynamic narrative empathy, it becomes clear that certain complexities
exist, including the notion that emotion and empathy are not in a one-to-one relationship. It is
well worth considering that a reader can have a strong emotional reaction to a character that they
absolutely do not empathize with, for example, Shakespeare's Iago in Othello; while contrarily,
one can have empathy with little emotional investment, or extreme emotional investment, causing
a reader to “hold their breath” for the resolution. Since this fluidity between empathy and
emotion is what dynamic empathy is based on, weaving them together with reader immersion
will help to resolve these complexities. This relationship will be disambiguated during the
analysis of The Left Hand of Darkness.
I have chosen Le Guin's novel for a variety of reasons. For one, its science fiction genre
highlights how immersion works, showing how it occurs even with situations and characters that
are literally “alien” to the reader. It also has two main first-person narrators, causing a reader to
form empathetic bonds with both, which affect empathies and emotions in profound ways.
Finally, the plot is sufficiently complex to show a full range of dynamic empathies, with
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immersion, empathy, and emotion ebbing and flowing throughout.
This paper will next discuss the theoretical background and then specifically review
literature pertinent to conceptualizing dynamic narrative empathy. This section will conclude
with a working definition of dynamic narrative empathy, which will then be applied, in an
analysis section, to Ursula K. LeGuin's The Left Hand of Darkness. This will display its use as a
tool in answering questions such as those considered earlier. Finally, the paper will conclude with
some thoughts on dynamic narrative empathies' use as a critical narratological tool, and its
implications for future studies.
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2. Theory and Literature Review
a. Background and previous research
In my BA project on narrative empathy I explored various ways in which the plot and
narrative help the reader develop empathy for characters. I call this a “static” study because I
assumed a certain (undefined) level of empathy would be created, and showed how the reader
would maintain that empathetic connection throughout a story. Most of the basic theories on plot
and character development highlighted in that study will be implicitly shown in my analysis of
The Left Hand of Darkness;1 however,there is one theory that will need reiteration, not being
discernible otherwise: It is the way a reader suspends disbelief. The notion comes from cognitive
psychologists Richard J. Gerrig and David N. Rapp, where they determine, through an empirical
study, that, regarding fiction, the assumption is that we “ordinarily would disbelieve a work of
literature … but … suspend that ordinary impulse as not to undermine their narrative experience”
(Gerrig and Rapp 268). Yet actually, “one of the basic facts is that readers must construct
disbelief: literature will have an impact unless readers expend specific effort to forestall that
consequence” (Gerrig and Rapp 280). Of course, to forestall it is to consider after the fact that it
is only a fiction. To back up this premise, another study, done in the Netherlands by P. Matthijs
Bal and Martijn Veltkamp, suggested that “readers accept assertions from a fictional narrative
unless the reader is highly motivated to reject the assertion and is able to reject the assertion
based on available knowledge” (Bal 3). 
The reasons why this is important to this study are that it highlights a different approach
to understanding fiction as a form of reality to a reader. Also significant is that, “the probability
that readers will construct disbelief is affected by the extent to which they are transported to
narrative worlds” (ibid); this assertion, conceptually, is endorsed in this paper: the deeper the
dynamic narrative empathy a reader experiences, the more profound the impact the story will
1 For example, when this paper speaks of “situational empathy,” it is a more detailed look at how plot draws a 




b. Suzanne Keen and Empathy
In Suzanne Keen's Empathy and the Novel, the intent was to connect a reader's empathy,
the sharing of affect with a character, to its effect on the readers altruistic behaviors in the actual
world (Keen vii). This paper, in assuming that empathy creation for fictional characters is
identical to empathy creation in the actual world, utilizes much of Keen's theory in defining
empathy and its relationship to emotion. 
Keen is very careful to distinguish between empathy and sympathy, and while both
bespeak emotion, they differ in how readers' emotions will relate directly or indirectly towards a
character. In order to have empathy, “reading must invoke cognition,” because reading is a
“complex cognitive operation” (Keen 28). With sympathy we may be unable to relate at a level
that invokes complex cognition. Keen differentiates between cognition that creates “cautious
reasoning that may inhibit empathy in the real world,” and a more uninhibited freedom of
imagination that would, “disarm readers of some of the protective layers,” allowing for greater
empathy towards a fictional world (Keen 30). This explains how fictional worlds may have more
fluidity in empathy than the actual world, because of this less guarded mental state allowed by
freedom in imagining. 
Contemplating whether these emotional elements are the same phenomenon in the actual
world and a fictional one, Keen considers how a realistically depicted character would “disarm
suspicion of [the character] and open the possibility for an emotional response … with a
compelling relation to contemporary reality” (Keen 32). Keen takes this further and notes that
readers also seem to identify with characters “even when the character and reader differ from
each other in all sorts of practical and obvious ways” (Keen 70). This has implications for this
study regarding readers' empathetic connection with the alien race in The Left Hand of Darkness. 
Connecting this notion to empathy, Keen attributes to Richard Gerrig the idea that, “a
theory of suspense must include with it a theory of empathy,” which manifests itself as caring for
what happens to a character caught up in a given situation, regardless of whether the character is
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relatable or not;  this is called, “situational empathy” (Keen 79).  This type of empathy readily
relates to dynamic action; Keen states, “empathy with plot situation gravitates towards middles of
plots” as “empathy with situations tends to zero in on episodes” (ibid). Episodic empathy is one
way a reader moves in and out of empathetic states. She indicates a difference between this type
of plot driven empathy and character driven empathy in how there can be “huge character-reader
differences” between their worlds but that the empathy is created none the less (ibid). This
distinction has a strong relationship to dynamic empathy and will be elaborated on in the analysis
section. 
Keen identifies certain characteristics of reader response to fiction that are likely to create
empathy. “Character identification,” is one, which in simplest terms, is a readers' direct
relationship with a character, understanding their motivations, recognizing traits, even in how real
the character seems to them (Keen 94). Other, more self-explanatory characteristics include: the
pace, the sequence of the narrative, nested narrative levels, secondary plots, and repetition (Keen
94). Curiously, Keen's research reveals a negative result regarding the narrative structure. Keen
attributes to cognitive narratologists W. van Peer and H. Pander Maat a study that expected first
person narrative roles to create “better fusion with the world of the character,” yet found it did
not. Ultimately, they stated that “it remains unclear why point of view has no more powerful and
no more overall effect on readers” (Keen 97). This idea will be addressed in the analysis section
of this paper.
While Keen's writing does address emotion, it mostly focuses on empathy, which while
very important and useful to this study, is only one element in the dynamic narrative empathy
chain. Thus, I will now turn to a more specific study of narrative emotion and its connection to
empathy, in Martha C. Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotion.
c. Martha C. Nussbaum and Emotion 
Martha C. Nussbaum's intention is to show that emotions are part of our cognitive
thinking processes, and theorizes that emotions can be applied to ethical judgements whereas in
previous studies, emotions were traditionally “sidelined in accounts of ethical judgements, as so
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often they have been in the history of philosophy” (Nussbaum 1). After careful consideration, she
defines emotions as “appraisals or value judgements, which ascribe things and persons outside
the person's own control great importance for that person's own flourishing” (Nussbaum 4).
Nussbaum creates a division between emotion and empathy in saying that “emotions include in
their content judgements that can be true or false, and good or bad guides to ethical choice”
(Nussbaum 1). Empathy seems to guide us towards emotion, but doesn't seem to have the
capacity for judgement.  It is helpful to consider emotion in a scenario where empathy is simply
absent, such as love for a sunset. Certainly a sunset can be emotional, and can be judged as good
or bad2, perhaps due to cloud cover, etc. yet we make no empathetic connection with a sunset.
Therefore we must consider emotion and empathy separately, with empathy as more of a link
than an outright emotion. This notion will be thoroughly scrutinized in the analysis section of this
paper.
In order for Nussbaum to consider emotion as a thinking process, as opposed to an
irrational reaction to a stimulation, she comes up with a very interesting proposition: That in
order to have an emotion, we must have a “narrative structure” (Nussbaum 234). This narrative
structure can be considered as a sort of backstory, or in Nussbaum's words as “emotion-histories”
(ibid).  As Nussbaum develops this narrative theory, the lines between emotion and empathy blur.
She writes “The 'subtle interplay' between baby and parent is crucially mediated by play with
narratives … [enabling the child] ... to imagine another person's experience” (Nussbaum 235).
Given a particular narrative context, this is either sympathetic or empathetic. Via the psychologist
D. W. Winnicott, Nussbaum considers the notion of “potential space,” an imaginative space
where we create a differentiation between ourselves and the world around us, this reflection
allows us to “imagine the experience [of another] and … respond appropriately” (Nussbaum
234). This sounds exactly like Keen's appropriate feeling in her description of empathy. The
difference is that Nussbaum utilizes this idea of appropriate feelings in describing emotion. She
points out that while literature can be “rich in emotionally expressive content” it must be
“appropriately perceived … with those emotions” (Nussbaum 237). Literature only becomes
empathetic if readers identify with the characters, allowing them to experience their emotions
(Nussbaum 238). Keen and Nussbaum divide in how these emotions are perceived and thus have
2 In so far as sunsets go.
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a somewhat differing sense of empathy. 
Keen considers that a conception of empathy exists that is perhaps not true empathy, but a
derivative form, a selfish view (Keen 80). On the other hand, Nussbaum makes the claim that
readers make a “eudaimonistic judgement,” which is a way of thinking in which we care about
the characters through our own wishes for a happy conclusion, for our own “well being”
(Nussbaum 238). She believes that we see narratives as possibilities for our own lives, if we “see
events as general human possibilities … [we] see them as possibilities for [ourselves]”
(Nussbaum 239). The critical difference is that Keen considers empathy as directed towards the
character, Nussbaum, towards the self.
Nussbaum's insistence that the reader continually directs empathy at the self becomes
problematic. At first, her basic definition: “empathy [is] an imaginative reconstruction of the
experience of the sufferer,” seems reasonable, but that the reader, “must also be aware of one's
own qualitative difference from the sufferer,” becomes questionable (Nussbaum 324,325). Why
this insistence on self-reflection?  Keen's notion, and the one I prescribe to, is that we share an
emotional space with a character, but do not replace the character. Nussbaum seems to be
worrying here about delusional thinking, which is understandable, if a bit unnecessary for merely
impassioned readers. However, she also acknowledges that her “account of empathy makes it
clear that empathy may be inaccurate” (Nussbaum 325). It is unclear how empathy can have this
quality. Empathy is not necessarily an emotion at all, considering it is possible to have empathy
without an emotional connection. This will be illustrated in the analysis of The Left Hand of
Darkness.
Nussbaum goes on to say that empathy may be a mechanism that draws our attention to
someone: “I have concern for her simply because my attention has now been directed to her,” and
attributes to Heinz Kohurt the idea that empathy is “an informer of appropriate actions”
(Nussbaum 328). This can be reasoned out to mean that empathy is a link to emotion. It also
seems that this link must lead to an appropriate emotion. Perhaps Nussbaum's claim that empathy
can be inaccurate is more to do with the emotional response it points to; is it a reliable informer?
It isn't that empathy-in-itself is wrong, but the wrong type of emotional response might be. Yet,
even at risk of being led down the wrong path, empathy is extremely important in Nussbaum's
opinion, and without it a person would seem quite psychopathic, and similar to my example of
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Othello's Iago, she points out that “something is worse than the empathetic villain” namely, the
villain without it (Nussbaum 331). 
Narrative empathy then, is a link that points us towards a particular character,
preliminarily setting us up for a certain emotional connection. We may have the empathy with
little emotional investment, or not really empathize yet be deeply affected emotionally. However,
while this empathy is towards the character, Nussbaum asserts that emotion is essentially
towards the reader. She proposes a reader will have stronger emotional reactions if the plot is,
“the sort of thing that might happen” to them (Nussbaum 243). Choosing to analyze a science
fiction novel will contest the notion that this is necessarily true. 
Even though this paper contends certain claims Nussbaum makes in emotional/
empathetic theory, others are very useful for the understanding of dynamic empathy. For
example, it stands to reason that narrative emotion is typically drawn towards things that might
occur in the actual world, that as a reader identifies with the situation, their emotional attention
will be deepened, and Nussbaum makes a strong point about how emotional connections can
completely disregard any empathy. Nussbaum elaborates: If a reader experiences a novel in a
self-reflective way, identifying with the characters, perhaps empathetically, but certainly
emotionally, then they also can identify with the antagonist, without empathy (Nussbaum 330).
This endorses empathy as a linking tool, which wouldn't be directed towards an antagonist,
regardless of our emotional depth towards them. It also makes it even clearer how the emotional/
empathetic relationship is likely to cause a dynamic action in the reader as the story unfolds. It is
left to see how this linking tool strengthens and weakens in theories of immersion. The paper will
now turn to Marie-Laure Ryan to look at immersion in depth, and its relationship to empathy and
emotion in defining dynamic narrative empathy.
d. Marie-Laure Ryan and Immersion
Marie-Laure Ryan's book Narrative as Virtual Reality 2 looks at virtual reality fiction,
considering narrative fiction as such, and its abilities to immerse the reader. Therefore, it is of
interest to this paper to understand what Ryan has to say about this  immersive experience, in
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order to link it with empathy and emotion. Ryan begins defining immersion by quoting a few
famous authors' conceptions of it, and while there are some differences, Charlotte Brontë, Joseph
Conrad, and Italo Calvino all have one thing in common: The reader should go to, or enter into,
that story-world. (Ryan 61,62). Thus, immersion is the phenomenon of a reader entering into the
story-world. Ryan explains how a text can not entirely build the story-world, and therefore, a
reader “constructs in imagination a set of language-independent objects, using as a guide the
textual declarations” (Ryan 63). We do this using a combination of past knowledge and
experience, “including knowledge from other texts” (ibid), which indicates that even highly
fictionalized worlds, inclusive of science fiction worlds, such as the one being analyzed in this
paper, become part of our experiences, which we do not necessarily disentangle from our actual
world experiences. Ryan explains this: “since … mimetic texts [aka: narrative worlds] include
fiction and nonfiction, the notion of textual world does not distinguish the worlds that actually
exist … from those created” (Ryan 64). The most important aspect of this is in how the text and
reader interact in such a way as to “animate characters and settings – in short, to conjure their
presence to the imagination” (ibid). This “conjuring” thus creates the fictional world in a reader's
mind.
For immersion, or “transportation,” which Ryan uses intermittently to describe steps a
reader takes to move into a textual world, she is careful to remark that a reader does not
distinguish between narrative fiction and nonfiction3, and that it does not matter how well or
poorly written it is for this transportation to occur (Ryan 66). Ryan does however, assume a
“minimum form of transportation” (Ryan 67) must be present for immersion. This differentiates
between a detached thinking about a text, considering it from the actual world, which would not
be immersive, to moving towards relating to it directly, from within the textual world. These
immersive 'levels' create. “a continued limited awareness … that what is perceived as real is in
some sense not real” (Ryan 68)4. These levels, from no immersion to full, are: “Concentration:”
texts that are “non immersive” due to reader difficulty in comprehension; “Imaginative
involvement:” where a reader remains detached yet aware of the “textual world”; and
3 Which further endorses Gerrig and Rapp's suspension of disbelief theory, readers must take in the story first, then
consider it against the actual world.
4 This, perhaps, is similar to Nussbaum's theory about being aware we are not the character, nor really in the story-
world.
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“Entrancement:” a fully engaged stage, where a reader is immersed as if in the story-world. Ryan
adds “however, this reader remains aware in the back of her mind that she has nothing to fear,
because the textual world is not reality” (Ryan 69). Nussbaum makes a similar sounding claim in
readers' being aware of their qualitative difference5 from the characters. But the reason I cried
when Helen Burns died in Jane Eyre is not because I thought I was an emaciated schoolgirl in
Victorian England, but, that I felt emotionally what it must have been like for Jane to lose such a
friend. The difference between Nussbaum's and Ryan's conceptions lies in the readers'
physicality; Ryan indicates that as immersed in the story as we may be, we have an awareness
that our physical presence is not in the story-world. This is understandable, but Nussbaum
extends this awareness to a reflection on emotion, which is difficult to accept, as it would
ultimately undo any emotional connection a reader could develop towards a character in any
fictional story. It is not a problem to put the novel Jane Eyre down and hop on a 21st century bus,
but not as easy to leave your emotions at the door. 
While Ryan discusses a physical space and time in her immersion theories, she does not
disregard the empathetic/ emotional. She considers emotion when she talks about “simulation
theory” which is “a form of counterfactual reasoning by which the subject places himself in
another person's mind” (Ryan 80). Thus, we make the move from projecting ourselves into the
story-world to “project[ing] ourselves into these characters” (ibid). Ryan states that “accessible
minds are certainly a source for immersion;” this type of immersion allows for an understanding
of a character's mindset, which “scaffold[s] the logic of narrative action” (ibid). Simulation
differs from imagination in the same way story-world physicality differs from emotional
immersion: imagination is the “representation of static objects,” while simulation is “the mental
images of dynamic objects” (Ryan 82). This gives Ryan two distinct areas of immersion,
representation and simulation, or “description imagery and enactment imagery” (Ryan 83). The
former is more involved6 with the physical story-world, the latter, the emotional/ empathetic one. 
When Ryan discusses “spatio-temporal” immersion, it is more directly
emotional/empathetic. This is where simulation is directed at character interaction vis-a-vis
object interaction. The main difference is in how the reader begins to “represent [...] characters as
5 Nussbaum 325.
6 Of course it should be understood that there will be a certain amount of crossover.
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subjects” as opposed to “looking at characters as objects” (Ryan 95). This is how a reader begins
to be able to relate to a character, as we do not typically relate to objects, even if we can imagine
them in such a way as to feel them or be in-their-space. Ryan also considers, “temporal
immersion” (Ryan 99), which is how a reader experiences time when reading.  When this
involves “the readers' interest in the hero's fate” (ibid), temporal dynamics can play a strong role
in narrative empathy. “Reader interest” can also constitute a form of shared emotion. Ryan
categorizes shareable emotions based on “affective intensities,” in how they affect immersion.
These groups include simple “subjective reactions,” such as judging characters or experiencing
schadenfreude, and “empathetic emotions,” like feeling happiness or sadness for a character
(Ryan 108). Both are present in The Left Hand of Darkness, and examples will be cited in the
analysis section. The main takeaway here is the dynamic interplay between emotion, empathy,
and immersion. 
While Ryan satisfies the question of immersion's role in dynamic narrative empathy she
exposes a conundrum; she considers the question of whether emotions felt towards fiction are
phenomenologically real; how can we have real emotions for fictional characters?  It is called the
paradox of fiction and emotion,7 and for dynamic narrative empathy to be valuable as a critical
narratological tool, showing that emotions and empathy towards fiction are real is of considerable
importance. Ryan alludes to a possible solution based on Noël Carroll's theories, in that our
simulated minds don't regard truth or falseness but “simulation makes it temporarily true and
present” (Ryan 114). However, philosopher Jeanne Deslandes has a much more comprehensive
response to this paradox, and utilizes a phenomenological approach to explore how empathy and
emotion come into being through reading; therefore, turning to her arguments will both answer
the paradox and solidify a definition of dynamic narrative empathy.
e. Jeanne Deslandes and the Phenomenology of Dynamic Empathy
Jeanne Deslandes paper “A Philosophy of Emoting,” “examines the experience of stirring
up emotion in reaction to fiction” (Deslandes 335). Her phenomenological approach solidifies the
7 This term is in wide use. It is cited in Deslandes from this paper 339.
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definition of dynamic narrative empathy and addresses the paradox of fiction and emotion. She
defines “phenomenon” as, that which is “manifest.” When emotions, “manifest while being
involved in fiction - the truth of a possible genuine emotion reveals itself” (Deslandes 341).  This
“genuine emotion” confronts the paradox itself, which is essentially:  how can emotion in
reaction to fiction be real, if the cause of the emotion, fiction, is not real?  (Deslandes 339). 
Deslandes focuses her defense against philosophers such as Kendall Walton who
“develops the concept of 'quasi-emotion,' “ essentially the idea that the reader is aware she is
experiencing a “make believe” or “second-order belief” (Deslandes 342). A strong argument for
quasi-emotion is that emotions from fiction do not cause physical reactions.  Deslandes initially
contends this with findings from multiple psychological researchers that determined “emotions
are tributary to the automatic nervous system, and do not need a voluntary large muscle reaction
to be genuine” (Deslandes 346). She then asserts that, “emotion is stirred up to focus attention,”
and further, “emotions initiate a decision-making process” (Deslandes 250, 351). She holds that
emotion and reason work together in determining how to deal with a situation. She shares with
Nussbaum the theory that reason, or logic, still functions through emotion, that “emotion does not
mute reason,” and that, “successfully or unsuccessfully, emotion joins with reason in the search
for the proper subjective response” (ibid).  “Reason” makes it unlikely to physically react to a
story without muting emotion. Reason works with empathy as well; a reader's empathy towards a
character does not necessarily involve physically helping them, the reader reasoning that they are
powerless to change anything. This  empathetic link becomes more evident when Deslandes
challenges Walton's claim that, “quasi-emotion … is different in intensity from real life emotion”
(Deslandes 352). His example is that we don't have the depth of fear we would have facing an
actual lion when facing a painting of one. Deslandes' rebuff refers to how we understand our
world in such a way as to perceive the threat from a painting as not as immediate as one from an
actual large predatory cat. She could have used empathy here: even if an image of a person
hanging off a precipice, for example, gives a viewer “vertigo,” it is not because they believe they
are about to fall, but is directed towards the person or people in the image, exactly as empathy
towards a character works in a novel. Empathy directs real emotion towards the other. In the case
of Walton's lion, the viewer only has themselves to consider, and there is no perceived threat.
With these counterarguments in place, Deslandes turns to applying phenomenology to fiction.  
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Deslandes proposes that there is a sort of “contract” between the reader and the fiction,
one that requires a passive state, “in order to arrive at the outcome of the narrative.” This passive
state actually makes the strength of the emotion higher, “wedged by the symptom, trapped in the
narrative … we are conscious that we have no power over the outcome whatsoever” (Deslandes
355). We perceive the threat as towards the character, our emotions aimed towards their well-
being. There is a communication between the reader and the character in this emotion. Just as in
the actual world, “emotions are 'transsubjective entities' that pass on between people” (Deslandes
359). This makes emotion “necessarily communicative” as readers interpret the emotional states
of characters (ibid). This necessary communication between a character and reader must be
directed in some way, and it could be considered an empathetic link, especially considering this
communication is “never [felt] for [our] own sake but rather … on someone else's account”
(Deslandes 360). Regarding emotion, both fiction and reality require “my thoughts and
imagination in order to fill the gaps in my understanding of the other” (Deslandes 361). This
parallel between the world of fiction and actuality shows them to be “not so very different” and
thus it is no stretch to assume our minds discern no difference, especially in emotional content.
Deslandes states the only difference is that, “the world proper exhibits an appresentation [sic] of
the other,” the fictional world, a “representation” (Deslandes 363). In other words, in the actual
world we first consider others as objects in the world, then, consider their implied meaning,
followed by any potentially emotional status; while in the fiction we move directly to the implied
meaning, then any potentially emotional state. Once readers move into this potentially emotional
state, they move from  “observ[ing] … the affective texture of the text – in the third-person,” to,
“also feel[ing] … the characters consciousness” in the first-person (Deslandes 364). As we make
this first-person connection “our identity is compromised,” in being connected to a character that
may or may not share our values; the deeper we immerse, the more we “become the other by
assuming the other's decision and the consequences of these decisions” (Deslandes 364).
Deslandes considers that “the fictional characters can only exist by virtue of the emoter's
investment” (Deslandes 365).  This investment is where dynamic narrative empathy plays a
strong role: in order to have a deep first-person understanding of a character, the reader needs to
have an emotional connection, usually signposted by empathy, and at least a minimal amount of
immersion. The less invested in a narrative, the more we slip into a third-person objective view.
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Slipping from first to third person and back is not binary, but dynamic. Metaphorically, “Fiction
is … very similar to memory. Memory can … trouble us emotively,” neither can be changed or
altered, and thus “at times, an obsessive remembrance [and a fictional text] will overpower us
emotively” (Deslandes 366). Both can be seen as having dynamic action; memories are relative in
strength, as are fictional narratives. Deslandes takes this to its logical limit, arguing that fiction
“can … inflict emotional harm” (Deslandes 367). A reader may experience this, willingly or
unexpectedly.  This endorses my disagreement with Ryan's claim, that, “an explanation of
empathy based on a full emotional identification … is not satisfactory ... because it would in
many cases make … reading fiction into an unpleasant experience” (Ryan 108). It seems that
sometimes it is an unpleasant experience, like having to put the book down for a while because it
is so intense. Even though we interact physically in the actual world, emotion is “hidden” in the
“world of the impenetrable other” (Deslandes 367); therefore, there really is no difference
between the actual world and fiction, in how we access emotional information. Similarly, while
we technically are fully immersed in the actual world, we are not always invested in others; thus,
once we have immersion in a fictive world, the dynamic action of the actual world is identical to
that of the world of fiction (Deslanded 360). 
By applying phenomenology to reader reactions to fiction, Deslandes has both addressed
the paradox of fiction and emotion, and helps in defining dynamic narrative empathy.  By adding
elements of Keen's theories on empathy, Nussbaum's theories on emotion, and Ryan's theories on
immersion, a definition of dynamic narrative empathy materializes: Dynamic Narrative Empathy
is the naturally occurring fluctuation in intensity of emotion, and/ or empathetic connection,
occurring between a reader and a fictional character, contingent on a level of immersion where a
reader can accept the story as feasible, bearing in mind that immersion also fluctuates throughout
a story. 
To put this theory to practical use, the paper will now analyze Ursula K. Le Guin's The
Left Hand of Darkness utilizing dynamic narrative empathy as a narratological tool to show how
it can help in answering questions about readers' response to fiction, such as why readers' care for
characters with different values than their own, how ambiguities can form, and why certain
stories affect our actual lives more than others. 
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3. Analysis and Discussion
a. Dynamic Narrative Empathy in The Left Hand of Darkness
At the start of Christine Cornell's study on Ursula K. Le Guin's novel, The Left Hand of
Darkness, she cites a survey that indicates that it is the most widely used novel in science fiction
college courses (Cornell 317). Yet despite this, and Cornell's own insistence that the “novel[s]
critical response remains bewilderingly diverse” (ibid), most of the research tends to focus on
gender,8 including Cornell's. On the other hand, theoretical approaches utilizing narrative
empathy and emotion are virtually non-existent; thus, this narratological study may be unique in
that respect. None the less it is not surprising that Le Guin's novel is generally approached from a
gender perspective, as the main story-line is about an envoy, the human male, Genly Ai, from an
interplanetary peace organization, the Ekumen, who visits Gethen, an icy planet of essentially
human, but gender neuter people, (who only “become” a gender during their sexual cycle, called
Kemmer), in order to share in a peaceful exchange of technology and knowledge. As his
relationship deepens with the other protagonist in the novel, Estraven, gender, and what it means
to be human, are increasingly highlighted; this is clearly a rich subject matter for gender studies.
However, I have chosen to focus on the two main narrators, Genly Ai and Estraven (sans gender),
showing the extraordinary dynamic of their relationship through the application of dynamic
narrative empathy. Doing this will help answer broader questions about readers' relationships
with fictional texts that have been discussed. 
Using Le Guin's novel has unique implications for immersion, empathy, and emotion.
Because Le Guin's novel is a science fiction, it does not make immersion a straightforward
endeavor. In a study of fantasy (science fiction) world-building, Stefan Ekman and Audrey
Taylor endorse Mark Wolfe's idea of “secondary worlds,” which, like Le Guin's novel, are
8 This can be seen clearly in database searches such as Literature Online (LION), Literature Online (Chadwyck-
Healy), and Literature Online (Proquest). The vast majority are gender studies, among with a handful of linguistic
and anthropological studies, while virtually none explore empathy.
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“fantasy worlds that are different than our own,” that take more effort to immerse into than
“primary worlds” (Ekman and Taylor 9), which, resemble our own, and would be easier to
immerse into. Le Guin's novel also has two main narrators, which introduces a more complex
reader relationship to empathy. Finally, the story is emotionally complex enough to “conceivably
contradict our own preconceptions to such a degree that it calls for drastic reactions, such as
throwing the book away … or being compelled to revise those preconceptions” (Cornell 319,
referring to Wolfgang Iser). 
Since immersion, empathy, and emotion, are relatively subjective, and we enter into a text
with preconceived notions, especially as critics, “a reader who attempts to maintain too great a
distance from the narrator may miss the experience offered by the novel” (Cornell 317).
Similarly, Wolfgang Iser, in his own phenomenological study, thinks “it is only when we have
outstripped our preconceptions and left the shelter of the familiar that we are in a position to
gather new experiences” (Iser 295), and further, readers are “open to the immediate experience of
the text,” once immersion is deep enough (ibid). These experiences imply a shared, objective
truth within the novel, limiting interpretive variance. This paper will assume this common
experiential stance, and approximate a typical reader response to the novels' stimuli. However,
even with large cultural and individual interpretive variances, the phenomenon of dynamic
empathy will still occur in all but a few readers. 
b. Dynamic Immersion
The theory has shown that immersion is key to any sort of empathy or emotion to develop
in a readers relationship to fiction. It also seems that immersion-in-itself is rather fluid, and thus,
even if a reader has, at one point, immersed enough to accept a story as feasible, they could, at
another point, conceivably lose the ability to connect empathetically or emotionally due to an
inadequate amount of immersion. Therefore, it is sensible to begin the analysis of The Left Hand
of Darkness with conceptions of immersion.
Le Guin's science fiction story-world does not immediately relate to our own, so our
initial immersive points of departure are character driven. As Keen notes, readers will relate with
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characters even with huge personal differences, as long as they are realistically depicted (Keen
32). Therefore, even though the story takes place on an alien planet, when Genly Ai, describing
Estraven, says “one feels the man's power … he cannot … say a word that is not listened to. He
knows it, and the knowledge gives him more reality than most people own … a human grandeur”
(Le Guin 7), and furthermore, “I'm not much taller than the Gethenian norm, but the difference is
most notable in a crowd …” (Le Guin 8), a reader is given a sense of human rather than alien.
Because Gethenians are shown to have complex human social characteristics, when Genly Ai
refers to himself as alien, “so [Estraven] often speaks, frank yet cautious, ironic, as if always
aware that I see and judge as an alien” (Le Guin 4), this indicates more a cultural than physical
alienation, as if the Gethenians are foreigners, not actual aliens.
While readers gather story-world information, they are in Ryan's concentration state9 of
immersion, gaining a sympathetic relationship with Genly Ai. Alone on an alien planet, he,
“longed for anonymity … I craved to be like everyone else” (Le Guin 8). Readers relate, but
identification with Genly Ai is not deep enough for empathy, especially when combined with the
low story-world immersion at this early stage. However, readers move towards an imaginative
involvement10 in the story-world as details of the main plot are revealed. When Genly Ai says “I
was cold, unconfident, obsessed by perfidy, and solitude, and fear” (Le Guin 20), readers can
relate to the cold, even the unconfident, as awareness of the textual world deepens,11 having been
lead to believe there is some intrigue happening. This conscious awareness slips into the
background as immersion in the story-world slowly deepens. By the time a reader reads about a
kind of mystical ceremony Genly Ai is part of, immersion is notably deepening into an
entrancement12 state; while the ceremonies' physical aspects, including, “zanies, perverts, and a
kemmerer,” cannot be connected in a real world context, readers accept it as truth without
detaching from the novel. When Genly Ai, “was made very uneasy by that silent electric tension,
by the sense of being drawn in … in the web,” and then, “I lost my balance, I was falling... If I
could not shut out this chaos … I would go mad,” his mental panic is shared; readers want him to






entrancement immersion in the story-world. Notably, this scene has very few points of reference
to the actual world; this is a good example of how minimal textual elements (e.g., “silent
tension,” and “losing balance”), still create such a deep state of immersion. 
Entrancement depths of immersion only require small signposts, physical feelings or
common thoughts, to keep readers in the story-world. This involves keeping the characters
relatable; readers typically share the feeling Genly Ai may be getting 'played' by Shusgis, a
particularly untrustworthy politician, when he thinks, “what Shusgis had not said on the subject
might have meant nothing at all to a man from Hain, … but I was born on Earth” (Le Guin 143).
Readers, so deep in the story-world, agree that that is how it works back on Earth. None the less,
the dialogue sometimes kicks the reader back out towards a more imaginative involvement state.
When Genly Ai ends up in prison, the dialogue becomes mainly descriptive: “much of the work
would have been pleasant, but we were too hungry and cold most of the time for any pleasure,”
with some sympathy creating sections: “Prisoners who had been there for several years were
psychologically and … physically adapted to this chemical castration … without shame and
without desire, like the angels. But it is not human to be without shame and without desire” (Le
Guin 177).  Without any emotional or empathetic attachment to the prisoners, readers can only
offer sympathy, unable to link to them empathetically. This is interesting, as an observer role,
with relatively low immersion, does not seem to allow for an empathetic connection, making
readers' at most, sympathetic. This displays Keen's distinction between empathy and sympathy; in
empathy, “we feel what we believe to be the emotion of others,” and in sympathy we “feel a
supportive emotion about your feelings” (Keen 5). If we don't have access to the humanity of the
characters, we can't engage empathetically13.
This may more specifically show where immersion needs to be in order to form
empathetic connections; namely, at the point where sympathy can become empathy. This access
point isn't emotional, because the presence of emotion itself does not automatically imply an
empathetic connection. When Genly Ai is being drugged in prison, and says, “I don't know what
drugs they used. I don't know the purpose … I have no idea what questions they asked … but
after the third or fourth of these examinations I was unable to get up” (Le Guin 178), readers are
13 Curiously, this lack of empathy could be due to the objective narration here, but it is not necessarily true in all 
cases, and in other examples in this study, it will be shown that narrative objectivity is not a clear indicator of 
whether a reader will be empathetic or merely sympathetic.
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locked in an immersive observer role, surely sympathetic, hoping he gets out of the situation, but
empathy needs a reliable narrator here14, so most readers are detached, just imaginatively
involved; immersion itself not quite deep enough for empathy creation. 
Contrarily, a deep entrancement level, even without emotion or empathy, can change a
sense of reader reality. Speaking of climate change on Gethen, Estraven explains that due to
certain pollutive qualities of the volcanoes, “the average world temperature … would in the end
be raised by some thirty degrees.” Genly Ai claims similar theories for Earth, readers concurring,
perhaps not even realizing they are sharing perspective with someone on another planet. This is
an example of Gerrig and Rapp's suspension of disbelief theory, only considering the facts of the
matter afterwards, if at all.
It seems clear that immersion is on a continuum, and thus dynamic in its own right,
without any particular need for empathy or emotion. However, both come into play once a
relative level of immersion is reached. Sympathy only requires a limited cognitive understanding,
thus, limits our need for particularly deep immersion; however, empathy may require a more
solid imaginative involvement (Keen 28). Once this is in place, empathy plays a key role in
dynamic narrative empathy, thus the paper will now explore empathies' role in this dynamic
relationship.
c. Dynamic Empathy 
Suzanne Keen proposes “that empathy for fictional characters may require only minimal
elements of identity, situation, and feeling” (Keen 69). So once an imaginative involvement level
of immersion is reached, empathy may form quite easily. This empathetic connection begins to
form while readers process Genly Ai's relationship with Estraven. When Estraven suddenly stops
helping Genly Ai, his feeling of betrayal are shared: Estraven was “selling me out … and I was a
fool to have trusted him” (Le Guin 16). This seed, once planted, becomes a situational empathy15
when readers are informed that others with Genly Ai's job had been killed or “locked up with
14 It is my belief that mentally unstable characters, such as those with psychoses or having drug induced 




madmen” (Le Guin 27); this makes the loss of Estraven a grave matter, so when Genly Ai finds
out Estraven has been deemed a traitor: “I cut off the radio … scuttled to the door … stopped …
went back to the table … I was no longer calm or resolute” (Le Guin 30), readers  share his panic,
linked by this secondary plot element.16 
A more subtle, but stronger character empathy17 begins forming as readers come to
understand Genly Ai's mindset more;18 when Genly Ai muses, “Traffic … all moves along … at a
rate of 25 miles per hour,”(which could go faster), he adds, “I wanted to get out and run” (Le
Guin 50).  This is easily relatable, and aligns the reader with Genly Ai. It is this kind of shared
realism that Keen means by character empathy. While situational empathy is rather
straightforward, character empathy is more subtle, forming a much deeper bond. When Genly Ai
travels to a village of “foretellers” (Le Guin 55) (to engage in the “mystical ceremony” cited in
the immersion section of this paper), he meets the leader, Faxe, who asks him a question that he
answers with, “I'm not sure. I'm exceedingly ignorant-” only to realize he had made a social faux
pas, and tries to fix it with, “I mean, I don't know anything about the foretellers-” this is met with
a sarcastic answer, and he does not know how to proceed (Le Guin 56). Readers' share his
uncertainty. These types of empathetic connection are nearly unconscious, which may relate to
Keen's theory that we disarm suspicion as characters are more realistically depicted. 
This disarmed state is maintained through character consistency. Gerrig and Rapp assert,
it is “consistency that allows readers to believe” (Gerrig and Rapp 272), which Keen also cites as
a key component in readers' empathy19. When Genly Ai, visiting Mr. Shusgis, the untrustworthy
politician sited earlier, suspiciously asks him if he is comfortable, uncharacteristically says “with
emotion, 'I feel perfectly at home' “(Le Guin 116), something seems wrong, but, when he follows
with, Mr. Shusgis's “acts of kindness served his interest and whose interest was himself. … I had
met him on earth … I expect to meet him in Hell” (ibid), it strengthens our empathetic faith, his
reaction being more consistent with our expectations. This consistency allows a reader to
empathize even when a character is wrong. When Genly Ai considers, “it crossed my mind,






nor had they brought me here. [Estraven] had” (Le Guin 121), he consistently chooses logic over
gut instinct, and thus, makes his error understandable. Without this empathetic understanding, a
reader might dismiss Genly Ai as arrogant, or unfeeling, instead of one using logic as a self-
preserving tool. This logically based empathy can draw a reader back into an imaginative
involvement state, one where readers share situational empathies, just looking at the situation.
When Genly Ai incorrectly “felt that the truck was going east,” and uses logic to explain his
error: “when the intellect won't or can't compensate for the wrongness, the result is a profound
bewilderment, a feeling that everything, literally, has come loose” (Le Guin 168), readers are
academically empathetic in 'getting it,'  but it is not very deep. 
A more powerful blending of situational and character empathy occurs when Genly Ai,
imprisoned in a truck with several other Gethenian citizens, “saw a girl, … smiling timidly,
looking for solace” (Le Guin 171). Readers simultaneously sympathize with the girl, and
empathetically share Genly Ai's detached position, knowing she is an alien, yet see her need for
human compassion. Noël Carroll conceptualizes this, saying,  “the audience's psychological state,
… diverges from … the characters in respect of belief, but converge on that of the characters with
respect to the way in which the properties of said [aliens] are emotively assessed” (Carroll 53).
Precisely because he sees her as alien, it is “the one time any one of them asked anything of me,
and I couldn't give it” (Le Guin 171). Our empathies do not let us detach20, so we share Genly
AI's logical decision when, “I was unable to do anything about any of this suffering, and
therefore accepted it, as they did, placidly” (Le Guin 173). Since readers empathize with Genly
Ai's logical reasoning to remain detached, both remain merely sympathetic to the suffering aliens.
However, the book has two main narrators, and they generate reader empathies in different ways.
While readers empathize with the guarded logic of Genly Ai, they come to empathize with
Estraven through his impassioned resolve and hopefulness. Thus, after Estraven risks everything
to break Genly Ai out of prison, readers understand Genly Ai's: “I don't understand what you did
this all for,” and empathize with Estraven's: “at that my temper broke … so I said to myself that
he was an ignorant man, a foreigner, ill-used and frightened” (Le Guin 196). Genly Ai's logic
cannot access Estraven's impassioned thinking. This makes readers empathetic to both, but for
20 It is beyond the scope of this paper, yet interesting to consider that empathy does not seem to be a “choice.” 
While we seem to have some re-directive control over our emotions, we may not have the capacity to say no to 
empathy.
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different reasons. When Estraven says, “Mr. Ai, we've seen the same events with different eyes”
(Le Guin 197), it helps to answer Keen's concern about first-person narratives not generating
more empathy towards that character (Keen 94); because regardless of who is narrating, there are
two entirely different empathetic connections to consider. When Genly Ai tries to justify his
logical approach to Estraven, saying, “I don't mean to be unjust,” Estraven answers, “yet you are.
It is strange. I am the only man in all Gethen that has trusted you entirely, and I am the only man
in Gethen that you have refused to trust.” Genly Ai finally recognizes Estraven's impassioned
nature, and says, “I'm sorry, Estraven” (Le Guin 199). This recognition deepens readers'
empathetic relationship to Genly Ai, which affects the overall level of immersion. When Genly
Ai is once again narrating, even in his descriptive, logical manner, readers remain in an
entrancement state of immersion.
This depth of immersion can make it seem like the narrative anticipates our thoughts by
subliminally answering our own questions. As Genly Ai is being helped escape prison across the
ice, he considers, “on a usual day we would have pulled for eleven or twelve hours, and made
between twelve and eighteen miles.” A reader may calculate that to be around one mile per hour,
and think “that is it?” The text responds with, “it does not seem a very good rate, but then
conditions were a bit adverse” (Le Guin 245). This engagement creates an unfiltered empathetic
understanding that allows us to read between the lines. For example, when Genly Ai says, “I
resented my companion's methodical, … insistence that we do everything … correctly and
thoroughly.” “I hated the harsh, intricate, obstinate demands that he made on me in the name of
life” (Le Guin 246), most readers interpret this as more than about regimented survival methods,
but, that these “obstinate demands” are being asked out of love.
Of course, love is an emotion, and up to this point the focus has been specifically on
empathy. It has been shown how readers move between various empathetic strengths and
immersive levels throughout the story. Understanding how immersion and empathy work
together in this dynamic way was necessary before considering emotion, which adds another
layer of complexity. For example, if empathy is a link between reader and character, than




and to understand what is meant by appropriate, how empathy is formed must be understood
first. The paper will now look at emotion in Le Guin's novel, showing its pivotal role in the
relationship between Genly Ai and Estraven and its importance to dynamic narrative empathy.
d. Emotion's Effect on Immersion and Empathy
In accordance with Nussbaum, emotion is a thinking process, allowing for true and false
judgements,23  and require a narrative to form. But emotion should not be mistaken for logic,
which is clear in how empathy towards Genly Ai initially forms, through a logical understanding,
with limited emotional content. However, this is not what happens with Estraven. When Estraven
narrates, readers find him different than Genly Ai, quite rational, but more emotional. It is
emotion that draws readers to his character, which comes quite suddenly through the account of
an unexpected meeting with his former lover, Ashe: “seeing his face in the twilight under the arch
of stone I felt the old habit of our love as if it had been broken yesterday.” In order to keep Ashe
safe, he must reject him, hiding his true feelings. It is the most emotional part of the book up to
this point, and readers are captivated by it. “As I spoke my anger and bitterness turned from Ashe
against myself and my own life, which lay behind me like a broken promise … I had done ill to
speak to him. I had done ill in all things” (Le Guin 73, 74). The emotion both deepens immersion
and forms an empathetic link to his character. 
With Genly Ai, readers are mainly empathetic to his choices through shared logical
sensibilities. Estraven communicates with the readers differently; when the main plot takes a turn
and Estraven becomes aware that his life is in peril, “[he] had been busy with pain and rage, but
not with fear, till now; I had not thought that the Order of Exile might be mere pretext for my
execution” (Le Guin 75), his rhetoric is more emotional than factual, creating a situational
empathy based on emotion. His emotional characteristics are no less realistically depicted than
for Genly Ai; when Estraven thinks, “some rise to present danger, not I … I grow stupid,” readers
empathize, sharing in Estraven's emotional frustration. When he worries about Genly Ai, “I am
afraid for him; he seems not to understand his danger” (Le Guin 86), readers share this fear with
23 Nussbaum 1.
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him, knowing this to be true of Genly Ai. These shared feelings are emotion based, but equally
valid to Genly Ai's more logical approach.
Once Genly Ai narrates again, the reader is in an entrancement state, with a strong
emotion based empathetic connection with Estraven. Therefore, when Genly Ai encounters
Estraven's former lover Ashe, and misreads him, we side with Estraven even though it is Genly
Ai's narrative; this is another example of how a first person narrative does not necessarily create a
closer bond with a character. However, emotion itself seems to play a strong role in focusing
readers' empathetic connections. When Ashe says, “Estraven – he believed you came here to do
good ... He believed it very strongly,” Genly Ai senses Ashe's love, realizing, “there was nothing
in this world for this man outside Estraven. He was one of those who are damned to love once”
(Le Guin 104). This show of emotional understanding from Genly Ai allows reader empathy
towards him to grow. When Ashe leaves, saying “quietly, 'Nusuth, no matter' “(ibid), his
emotional pain is understandable,  and readers share Genly Ai's own empathy towards him, a sort
of nested narrative empathy, and it is quite powerful. 
Being emotionally involved with both characters, a certain tension is introduced,
especially regarding miscommunication. This tension seems to go beyond Nussbaum's
eudaimonistic judgement;24 it is not for our sake that we want them to understand each other, but
for the well being of the characters25. When Estraven comes to warn Genly Ai of the critical
danger he is in, Genly Ai completely misreads the situation, thinking, “I was glad to get this
confrontation over with at once. It was plain that no tolerable relationship could exist between
Estraven and myself … he had made neither his acts nor his motives clear to me in Erhenrang,
and I could not trust the fellow” (Le Guin 129). Readers empathetically understand, realizing he
does not know Estraven is on his side, but since readers know he is, it creates an emotional
tension that drives immersion deeper still. 
Emotion is not always clearly directed, and when Estraven is once again narrating, and
thinks, “Genly Ai demands of us an inordinate trustfulness. To him evidently it is not inordinate”
(Le Guin 148). Readers are empathetic with this conundrum, yet not directed towards a particular
emotion. This helps explain Nussbaum's theory claiming that empathy can be inaccurate; but
24 Nussbaum 238.
25 In a sense it is more of a selfless non reflective care that emerges here than the more self reflective eudaimonistic 
one Nussbaum speaks of.
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empathy isn't the problem, it is accessing which emotion to use. This could be due to having two
equally empathetic characters to consider simultaneously, with differing emotion states. For
example, Estraven's narrative makes readers feel fear for Genly Ai, whose own seems tinged with
childlike curiosity. This is evident in: “The Envoy spoke well … There is an innocence in him
that I have found merely foreign and foolish … yet in another moment … [he] reveals a
discipline of knowledge and largeness of purpose that awes me” (Le Guin 155). Readers share
Genly Ai's innocence and purpose, often without emotion, while simultaneously sharing
Estraven's more emotional mindset even when it is not specifically directed. As emotion slides
along the scale from being somewhat unspecific to intensely focused, it effects the dynamic in
reader empathies in similar fashion. This dynamic is sometimes welcome, as emotional empathy
is not always pleasant for the reader; when readers are aware that Genly Ai will not heed
Estraven's warning of impending danger, saying,  “what good is it, Mr. Harth? You know that I
can't rely on what you say,” we share in Estraven's frustration, “It is too late … they look at the
man from another world and see what? A spy from Karhide, a pervert, an agent … It is my fault.
I have done nothing right” (Le Guin 159), emotions allow readers to share Estraven's genuine
concern, while non-emotional empathies allow an understanding of Genly Ai's over-cautious
logical reaction; this split in empathies opens up ambiguities, an uncertainty of who is right and
who is wrong, which serves to immerse readers to the deepest level. Yet, deep immersion alone is
not able to sustain empathy, and when Genly Ai is being drugged in prison, readers' lose their
empathetic connection as he becomes an unreliable narrator for a time26. When Genly Ai is lucid
again, emotion is the main catalyst in our empathetic reconnection. This is evident in Genly Ai's
conversation with a dying prisoner (Astra): “ 'is [the Earth] a place of reward, then? Or a place of
punishment?'  'I don't know Astra. Which is this world?'  'Neither, child. This here is just the
world … you get born into it … things are as they are.'  'I wasn't born into it. I came to it. I chose
it.'  'Ah well … Ah well, … We none of us choose' ” (Le Guin 182). The emotional realism in
this passage reconnects readers to Genly Ai, and puts a human face on the aliens.
With stable immersion, emotion creates a fluctuation between an observer's role and an
empathetic one. When Estraven factually explains the escape plan, readers interestingly take in
26 As previously explained, when Genly Ai is being drugged and the dialog is mainly descriptive, there is no 
“character” for empathy to link to, most likely a reader is sympathetic to Genly Ai's situation. 
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the information, but when it becomes personal, readers are empathetic. When Estraven, “settled
[his] plans, and began to ready my will and body to enter dothe” (Le Guin 190), readers don't
need to know what “dothe” is to identify with his nervous anticipation. It also seems evident that
emotion can deepen existing empathies as well. When the story moves from the descriptive, “I
got Ai up over my shoulders … went northeast … clambered up over the dead fence … and made
off as fast as I could towards the river,” to the more intense “I was not far from the fence when
the whistle began to shriek and the floodlights went on … it snowed … but not hard enough to
cover my tracks … “ (Le Guin 191), readers dip from an empathetic observer state to a deeper
emotionally empathetic one, holding their breaths along with Estraven.
In Le Guin's novel, emotion plays a strong role in reader ambiguities; taking an
empathetic “side” is made all the more difficult by our emotional investment in both characters.
Dynamically, we rarely react to the characters as a unit, but mostly as individuals, creating a
natural push and pull throughout the story-line. In their escape across the ice,  Genly Ai gets sick,
and Estraven stops out of concern, yet Genly Ai claims, “I'm not sick, you know,” and Estraven
responds, “No. I don't know. If you won't say frankly, I must go by your looks” (Le Guin 218).
Readers understand Genly Ai being “galled by his patronizing,” his stoic wish to forge ahead, but
align more with Estraven's sensibilities. When Genly Ai reflects, “perhaps I could dispense with
the more competitive elements of my masculine self- respect, which he certainly understood as
little as I understood shifgrethor27...” (Le Guin 219), readers once again, align with both. This
functions to keep readers entranced in the story-world, so when the pace takes one back into an
observer position, even the landscape has an emotional effect: when Genly Ai describes, with,
“Estraven … besides me looking at the magnificent and unspeakable desolation. 'I'm glad I have
lived to see this,' he said” (Le Guin 220), readers see this not just vividly, but emotionally,
empathetically sharing the scene with the characters.
Emotional empathy for one character can help draw our empathies towards another. When
Estraven ponders, “while [Genly Ai] has lived a few hours in one of those unimaginable ships …
everyone he had left behind him at home grew old and died, and their children grew old … I said
at last, 'I thought myself an exile' ” (Le Guin 222), readers come to understand, through
Estraven's emotional revelation, Genly Ai's sacrifice, deepening our emotionally empathic bond
27 The Gethenian version of social etiquette.
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with him. 
This shows how readers can gain empathies either directly or indirectly through emotional
connections with characters. But emotion also affects and is affected by immersion in the story-
world. This interplay not only happens within a novel, but can effectively change a reader's way
of thinking in their real lives.
e. Dynamic Narrative Empathies' Effect in the Actual World
Virtually all of the researchers this paper has cited in developing the theory of dynamic
narrative empathy endorse the idea that narratives have real world effects on readers.
Demonstrating the possibility of this is also one of the aims of this paper. By putting all the
components of dynamic narrative empathy together and applying them to the novel, the affect of
the narrative on readers' actual lives can be shown. Deep into their ordeal on the ice, with readers
fully entranced in the narrative,  Estraven goes into kemmer, the Gethenian sexual phase, and he,
“was afraid [Genly Ai] would laugh at me.” Yet, when, “rather he spoke with a gentleness that I
did not know was in him. After a while he too came to speak of isolation, of loneliness” (Le Guin
232), this natural feature within the story-world creates a situational empathy that is full of
emotion, deepening the readers' character empathy towards Genly Ai more than any other point
in the story. This depth of reader emotion mixes with  empathy in such a way that a readers
personal biases begin disarming. It is what Christine Cornell called revising our preconceptions28.
As their relationship grows, Genly Ai thinks, “until then I had rejected him … he had
been quite right to say … the only person on Gethen that trusted me, was the only Gethenian I
distrusted.” “He was the only one who had entirely accepted me as a human being.” And then, “it
was from that sexual tension between us … admitted … but not assuaged, that the great and
sudden assurance of friendship between us rose … so well proved … that it might as well be
called, now as later, love” (Le Guin 249). With the reader so deeply immersed and emotionally
empathetic, when they decide against a sexual relationship, keeping it profoundly mental, “we
had touched, in the only way we could touch. We left it at that. I do not know if we were right”
28 Cornell 319.
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(ibid), the reader is also unsure; all notions of alien and heteronormativity become lost to the
deeper matter of love. This is a good example of Keen's theory that we may have shed our
“protective layers” to accept characters different in such “practical and obvious ways” (Keen 30,
70).  Readers make a move from a mentally passive state to a more active one29, sharing in the
protective bond the characters have formed with one another.
This protective bond may lead many readers to prioritize the relationship over the
mission. Therefore, they strongly empathize with Genly Ai, after having made it across the ice, in
showing difficulty choosing between the mission and his relationship; “depressed by the prospect
of … Estraven [going] back into exile, leaving me alone”(Le Guin 275). Without this emotionally
empathetic connection, a reader may wonder if the story is off track, returning to an imaginative
involvement state, but Le Guin balances the priority between the relationship and the mission by
making the descriptive dialogue more emotional. When Estraven is recounting their trip across
the ice in a local tavern, Genly Ai thinks, “I listened as fascinated as all the rest, my gaze on my
friend's dark face” (Le Guin 276). Even when he is doing business for the mission, he “constantly
missed Estraven's presence beside me” (Le Guin 279). Being torn between the mission and what
it may mean for their friendship, Genly Ai signals his ship with quiet resolve, “I did not know if I
had done right to send it. I had come to accept such uncertainties with a quiet heart” (Le Guin
280). This question reflects back on the reader, also being torn between the resolution of the main
plot, and worry over what it will cost the relationship.
Most readers have chosen the relationship by the time Genly Ai forecasts Estraven's fate,
“I realized what my selfishness and Estraven's silence had kept from me, … what he was getting
into.” It confirms what readers have already suspected, and Genly Ai confirms, that, “they shot to
kill [Estraven]. He was dying when I got to him … I took his head in my arms and spoke to him
… only in a way answered my love for him, crying out … once, clearly 'Arek!' Then no more30”
(Le Guin 283, 284). This is particularly devastating because all the components of dynamic
narrative empathy: immersion, empathy, and emotion, are at their deepest at the time of
Estraven's death.
Le Guin, demonstrating a mastery of storytelling, does not allow this moment to kill the
29 While a reader must remain passive to see the story through, they can change their focal point, investing in what 
parts of a story matter the most to them.
30 Arek, the name of Estraven's late brother whom he was close to.
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story along with Estraven31. Readers are still deeply empathetic to Genly Ai, who, overcome with
emotion, considers why he never cried: “it was not shame so much as fear,” “Now I went on …
through the evening of his death … [and] found you can weep all you like, but there's no good in
it” (Le Guin 285). Readers' know he is trying to be stoic, perhaps themselves weeping; this, a
challenge to Walton's quasi-emotion,32 in questioning how this emotion can be quantified as
something less than real. None the less, in assuming these emotions are real, this scenario shows
how readers can be genuinely effected in their actual lives by fictional events. 
Within the story, both Genly Ai and the reader have changed. When he returns to the King
and is no longer afraid of the confrontation, readers share this feeling, satisfied when he says of
Estraven, “ 'he loved his country very dearly, sir, but he did not serve it, or you. He served the
master I serve.' 'Mankind' ” (Le Guin 293). Even the King is redeemed, when he says, “Estraven
would be a good man to pull with, on a crazy trek like that … I'm sorry he's dead” (Le Guin 294).
Because readers share the emotional loss of Estraven with Genly Ai, it is bittersweet when the
ship comes down and Genly Ai considers Faxe's remark, “ 'I'm glad I have lived to see this' … as
Estraven had said when he looked at the ice … so he should have seen this night. To get away
from the bitter regret that beset me I started to walk … towards the ship” (Le Guin 295). The
emotion is not only  too overwhelming for Genly Ai, but is shared by the readers. Both need to
change focus, take a logical approach. This is empathy at its deepest, deep enough to actually
have a real world effect. When Genly Ai's attending doctor says, “ 'this is a marvelous thing, the
coming of men from the stars. And in my lifetime' ” (Le Guin 296), readers' share in Genly Ai's
response: “ 'it is a marvelous thing indeed for them [the Ekuman] as well, the coming to a new
world, a new mankind' “ (Le Guin 296, 297). A marvelous thing for the readers as well, having
assimilated the Gethenians through sharing in Genly Ai's journey. This is a potential learning
experience for the readers, in how to approach other cultures in their real lives.
Dynamic narrative empathy can also explain how the story itself lives on; seeking closure,
Genly Ai visits Estraven's home. He still struggles with logic over heart, thinking “I have come
on a fool's errand to Estre, hoping for solace,” arguing that “nothing could be changed now”
31 When a character is taken out of a story, (usually suddenly), that a reader has a deep empathetic connection with, 




(LeGuin 299). But readers are beyond simply sharing experiences with Genly Ai, now able to
disagree while remaining deeply empathetic, knowing it necessary for him to take this journey.
Estraven, although absent, has been assimilated by the readers. This allows readers to see
Estraven in his son, who asks, “ 'will you tell us how he died? - Will you tell us about the other
worlds … the other men … the other lives?' “(Le Guin 300),  assuring the story will go on. Even
more interesting is Cornell's  suggestion that, “the story of Genly and Estraven is destined to take
its place among the legends of the domain33” (Cornell 324).  Not only does the story-world
continue on 'by itself,' but, in ending with dynamic narrative empathy at its deepest level,34 The
Left Hand of Darkness continues on in the reader as well. 
33 Throughout the novel there are several chapters dedicated to explaining lore and cultural histories, thus the idea 
here, that this story-in-itself will become part of that canon.
34 This is of considerable importance. If a story ends without at least a moderate empathetic connection to any 
character or similar situational empathy, then it may pass into oblivion in a readers mind. However, the more 
powerful the dynamic empathetic bond is at the end, the more likely the story will live on in the reader. 
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4. Conclusion
By blending theories involving narrative empathy, emotion, immersion, and readers'
phenomenological relationship with a text, this paper defines Dynamic Narrative Empathy as the
naturally occurring fluctuation in emotion, empathy, and immersion a reader has when interacting
with a fictional text, dependent on at least a minimal level of immersion. This minimum level of
immersion manifests when a reader begins imagining the story-world and characters as feasibly
realistic. Once this occurs, these three elements combine to form a fluid relationship between a
reader and a text. With emotion, empathy, and immersion at their strongest, readers' conceptions
and principles can effectively change in the actual world. 
By applying dynamic narrative empathy to Ursula K. Le Guin's The Left Hand of
Darkness the paper has aimed to show its use as a critical analytical tool. The narratological study
revealed, among other things, how reader ambiguities form; as the dynamic empathy between
characters ebbs and flows, readers' preconceived notions are challenged by alternative
interpretations regarding which actions and characters are right and wrong, despite a reader's
actual world beliefs. Regarding actual world beliefs, the paper shows that once readers' switch
from focusing on the main plot to caring more for the characters, they begin acknowledging
character ideologies that may be completely unlike their own. Once readers come to accept these
alternatives in the characters, it challenges their actual world thinking. At the end of Le Guin's
novel, not only do the characters live on in the story-world, but in readers' imaginations as well.
The depth of dynamic empathy effects the intensity and longevity of this phenomenon. This
depth also explains why some stories do not have this effect on readers: in the dynamic empathy
not being deep enough for readers to imagine the characters as part of their lives on the story's
completion. The analysis shows that this is all on a scale that is quite fluid, with each component
part affecting another. By applying dynamic narrative empathy to  Le Guin's novel, my analysis
tempted to disambiguate this interplay, by, for example, showing how even when enough
immersion is present for empathy or emotion to form, neither necessarily does. However, with
either present, immersion can deepen considerably. This is also shown in the relationship
32
between emotion and empathy: one can appear without the other, but together can deepen the
overall dynamic narrative empathy in readers.
All fictional narratives with sufficient complexity have dynamic narrative empathy
present in them. Therefore its use as a narratological tool is evident. It could be a useful in
explaining such things as why certain narratives fail to remain memorable, or certain stories
remain ambiguous or dissatisfying. This is not limited to novels, and could be extended to
analyze film and even video games; any fictional narrative able to produce enough immersion
can be examined. It would be very interesting to apply dynamic narrative empathy to a narrative
with equally empathetic characters with opposing moral views, to determine how a reader may
modify or change their own way of thinking to accommodate for this discrepancy. 
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